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In the past decade changes in oil prices have played a significant role in shaping 
inflation dynamics in the US and in the euro area, largely through their direct effect on fuel 
prices. This has revived the controversy over whether the prices of petroleum products 
respond more promptly to positive oil price shocks than to negative ones.  
This paper provides fresh evidence on this issue for the US, the euro area and the four 
largest euro-area countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), for both petrol and diesel 
prices. Inference is based on the dynamic response of downstream prices to upstream shocks 
– rather than on tests on the regression slopes as in the majority of existing studies – and 
takes into account the non-linearity of the impulse response function in models with 
asymmetric adjustment, so far ignored in the literature. The empirical analysis shows that 
fuel prices respond very promptly to oil price shocks, with some heterogeneity across 
countries, and that no systematic evidence of asymmetries emerges. This result is robust 
across periods of high and low oil price volatility and holds both for standard and large 
shocks. 
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 *  Bank of Italy, Economic Outlook and Monetary Policy Department.    1 Introduction
The debate over whether fuels consumer prices adjust asymmetrically to oil price shocks
started in the 90s when the ﬁrst Gulf war boosted crude prices volatility and consumer
groups in the US complained of gasoline price downward stickiness (Karrenbrock, 1991).
A rich literature followed (labeled “rockets and feathers”, after the deﬁnition given by
Bacon, 1991, to the asymmetric response of gasoline prices), including applied work and
theoretical models aiming at rationalizing the optimality of asymmetric price adjustments.
The rapid increase of the price of oil since 2005 has revitalized this controversy both in
the public opinion and in policy environments.1
The relationship between motor fuels and oil prices has always attracted a lot of
attention from market regulators as asymmetries in the pass-through from upstream to
downstream prices could result from collusive behavior. The US Congress, for example,
requested the General Accounting Oﬃce (henceforth GAO) to report on this issue after
the early 90s Persian Gulf Crisis, partly to respond to concerns from independent gasoline
dealers complaining of predatory pricing by major reﬁneries. In 2007 an investigation by
the Italian antitrust authority (the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato,
henceforth AGCM) veriﬁed the existence of collusive price setting behavior by the eight
large oil companies that supply liquid fuels in Italy.2 More recently, in March 2009, the
European Commission began an inquiry on the relationship between wholesale and pump
fuel prices following pressure from the Federation Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA)
concerned that, in some European countries, petrol prices were not responding quickly
enough to falling oil prices.3 The issue is important for consumer welfare as these items
constitute around 5% of household expenditure, both in the US and in the euro area.4
The behavior of petrol and diesel prices is of great interest also for monetary authorities
for a number of reasons. First, according to recent estimates for the euro area (European
Central Bank, henceforth ECB, forthcoming) fuels prices account (i) for most of the direct
1fabrizio.venditti@bancaditalia.it. I wish to thank Aidan Meyler for help with the data, Giulio Nico-
letti, and above all Giovanni Veronese. Many ideas in this paper come from previous joint work with
him. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect those of
the Bank of Italy.
2See Provvedimento n. 17754 at http : ==www:agcm:it.
3See http : ==fiabrussels:com=en=news=archive=commission_takes_fia_worries_seriously:htm
where the FIA press release is posted and also “Brussels to investigate overpricing at petrol pumps”,
TimesOnline, March, 5th 2009.
4The theoretical literature, however, has long recognized that asymmetries might originate from other
factors than collusion among large players. If markups are procyclical, for example, the diﬀerence between
crude and retail prices might increase in periods of economic expansion and fall in periods of recession
(Reagan and Weitzman, 1982). The response of consumers might also cause asymmetries in the adjust-
ment of downstream prices. A price increase might trigger expectations of higher future prices, therefore
leading consumers to anticipate their demand and strengthen the price momentum. In the face of a
price decrease, on the other hand, consumers might want to wait for future lower prices without further
depressing current prices (Brown and Yucel, 2003). Finally, asymmetries in inventory management costs
might spill over to retail prices (GAO, 1993, and Borenstein et al., 1997).
5eﬀects of oil price shocks on consumer inﬂation (ii) for around half of the ﬁnal impact
on overall inﬂation, which includes not only direct but also indirect and second-round
eﬀects. Second, energy price ﬂuctuations have a large eﬀect on inﬂation perceptions as
consumers attach a disproportionate weight to the price changes of the items that are most
frequently purchased (essentially fuels and food) in forming their perceptions on overall
inﬂation (Ranyard et al., 2008, Del Giovane and Sabbatini, 2008). Finally, fuels prices
are ten times as volatile as overall inﬂation. Fuels price shocks are therefore potentially
able to disanchor inﬂation expectations and set oﬀ inﬂation scares or deﬂationary traps
(Orphanides and Williams, 2003, Evans and Honkapohja, 2009).5 In this respect any
asymmetry in the behavior of fuels prices could potentially impact on inﬂation perceptions
and expectations, with direct consequences for monetary policy.
The “rockets and feathers” issue has received considerable attention in the literature.
However, a recent contribution by Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) has shown that all the ex-
isting papers on asymmetric eﬀects of energy prices shocks suﬀer from important method-
ological limitations which make their results questionable. Their argument can be sum-
marized as follows. In this literature the issue of asymmetries is usually tackled on the
basis of regression models in which fuel price changes are regressed against past fuels and
oil price increases and decreases. In the majority of the existing studies evidence in favor
or against asymmetries is then provided by testing that the coeﬃcients of rises and falls
are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other. This approach, however, cannot provide
a convincing case either in favor or against asymmetries because, given the presence of
censored endogenous variables which makes the model non-linear, in this setup there is
no clear correspondence between the slopes of the estimated equations and the dynamic
responses to an exogenous shock: small asymmetries in the slopes could be associated
with large asymmetries in the responses and vice versa. Furthermore a test on the coeﬃ-
cients does not give any information on the persistence of the responses: if a test on the
coeﬃcients detected some asymmetries one would be still left with the question whether
these asymmetries quickly fade away or are instead long lasting.
A minority of studies in this literature has analyzed impulse responses. These studies,
however, are also ﬂawed as they use the incorrect impulse response function, the so called
cumulative adjustment function (henceforth CAF, see Borenstein et al., 1997). In this
paper I show that this function can be obtained from the correct non linear IRF by
imposing strong restrictions on the dynamics of the models. The consequences of these
restrictions are that (i) they (incorrectly) make the response invariant to the size of the
shock, so that liquid fuels prices are restricted to respond in the same fashion to small
and large shocks and (ii) they shut oﬀ the endogenous response of oil prices to their own
shocks and therefore understate the eﬀect of an oil price shock onto liquid fuel prices.
In this paper I take Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) critique into account and through the
5To substantiate this concern, which might at ﬁrst sound far-fetched, I plot in Figure 1 the Google
Index of intensity of searches of the word “deﬂation” since 2004 together with the rates of growth over the
previous three months of the fuels components of the euro area HICP and of the US CPI. It is suggestive
that the peak of the Google Index roughly coincides with the trough in the liquid fuels inﬂation rates.
6lens of non linear impulse responses (Koop et al., 1996) test whether liquid fuels (petrol
and diesel) prices respond more to positive than to negative oil price shocks in the US,
in the euro area and its largest constituent countries (Germany, France, Italy and Spain).
I improve upon the literature in two directions. First, diﬀerently from papers based on
coeﬃcient testing, I look at the dynamic response of fuels prices fully taking into account
the non-linearity of the model. Second, I depart from the simplifying assumption implicit
in the use of CAF and study the impact of oil price shocks in a setting in which (i) shocks
of diﬀerent sizes have a diﬀerent eﬀect on liquid fuels prices and (ii) oil prices are also
allowed to respond to their own innovations.
The empirical analysis shows that fuels prices respond very promptly to oil price
shocks, generally in less than four weeks, both in the euro area and in the US. Within the
euro area the adjustment is faster than the average in Germany and, to a lesser extent,
in France, while it is slower in Italy and Spain. In the large majority of cases the null
hypothesis of symmetry cannot be rejected, irrespectively of the size of the shock. Some
asymmetries can be found, especially in France and the US, in response to large oil shocks
(twice the standard deviation of the oil price innovations) but they are conﬁned to the
contemporaneous response.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 stresses the diﬀerences between the
present approach and the ones used in the existing literature. Section 3 provides a de-
scription of the main properties of the data. Section 4 presents the empirical model,
clariﬁes the assumptions behind the identiﬁcation of oil price shocks, describes the algo-
rithm for computing impulse responses and discusses how the CAF relates to the correct
non linear IRF. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Relation with the existing literature
An exhaustive critical appraisal of the existing evidence on the fuels/oil asymmetry would
require a separate paper. Here I draw on two excellent surveys: the former is the report
to the US Federal Trade Commission by Geweke (2004), which focuses on the US; the
latter is a paper by Manera and Frey (2007), which deals more generally with econometric
models of asymmetric price adjustments.
Most of the studies reviewed are based on some variation of an equilibrium correction
model in which downstream prices, following an upstream shock, are allowed to adjust
asymmetrically towards their long run value, which is usually pinned down by a cointe-
gration relationship. These studies are however, characterized by a large heterogeneity
not only in the datasets used, but also in the deﬁnition of asymmetry considered. In their
review of the literature Manera and Frey (2007) categorize up to six forms of asymmetries
in linear models depending on whether the asymmetry is conﬁned to some speciﬁc coef-
ﬁcients (the impact response, rather than the adjustment to the equilibrium correction
terms or the sum of the dynamic coeﬃcients, etc.). Most of these deﬁnitions of asym-
metries, however, are based on coeﬃcients testing, and are therefore unsuitable, for the
7reasons highlighted in the Introduction, to properly address the “the question of whether
there is a systematic tendency for downstream prices in the oil well-to-service station gaso-
line industry to respond to increases in upstream prices more rapidly than downstream
prices respond to decreases in upstream prices” (Geweke 2004), a question that can only
be answered by looking at impulse response functions. Interestingly, however, a large part
of the empirical literature is based on coeﬃcient testing (Bacon, 1991, Karrenbrock, 1991,
Duﬀy-Deno, 1996, Galeotti et al., 2003, Godby et al., 2000, Grasso and Manera, 2007,
Meyler, 2009).
Some authors have explicitly looked at impulse response functions (Balke et al., 1998,
Bettendorf et al., 2003, Borenstein et al., 1997, Bachmeier and Griﬃn, 2003, Rodrigues,
2009). They all, however, perform a very restrictive dynamic exercise in which oil prices
are changed by one unit and the dynamic response of downstream prices is assessed
assuming that (i) there is no further response of the oil price, (ii) there are no further
shocks, (iii) the system prior to the shock is in equilibrium. The limitations of this
type of exercise are ﬁrst stressed in Geweke (2004) who notices that “The relevant real
world experiment consists of [...] an unending succession of shocks to upstream price.
So long as there is no asymmetry in the response of (the endogenous variable) to lagged
values of itself this [...] is unimportant. [...] Given asymmetry in response to lagged
values of (the endogenous variable) [...] the only practical way to assess any response of
downstream to upstream price changes or volatility is through a full dynamic simulation
of the model.” Kilian and Vigfusson (2009), building on Koop et al. (1996), show how
to perform such a full dynamic simulation and correctly compute impulse responses in a
model that accommodates asymmetric responses.
An interesting implication of Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) setup is that, since the en-
dogenous variable responds asymmetrically to its own lags, the eﬀect of an oil price shock
is non-linear. I exploit this property of the model and investigate the diﬀerent eﬀects of
large oil price surprises compared to standard ones. This issue is not novel in the literature
and is already addressed in Godby et al. (2000), Al Gudhea et al. (2007) and Radchenko
(2005a). These papers, however, are not immune from the limitations discussed above.
In particular Godby et al. (2000) apply a threshold error correction model to weekly data
in the Canadian retail markets but base their inference on tests on the regression slopes.
Al Gudhea et al. (2007) use impulse responses from a Threshold Vector Error Correction
Model, which Kilian and Vigfusson (2009) show to be misspeciﬁed. Finally Radchenko
(2005a) uses a Markov Switching model to separate permanent from transitory shocks
but bases his inference on the cumulative adjustment function.
In terms of ﬁndings, the balance seems to be in favor of asymmetries in the US, for
which some form of asymmetric adjustment is reported by Karrenbrock (1991), Duﬀy-
Deno (1996), Borenstein et al. (1997), Balke et al. (1998) and, more recently, Radchenko
(2005a). Recent evidence for European countries, on the other hand, ﬁnds little support
for asymmetric adjustment (Meyler, 2009 and Rodrigues, 2009).
83 Data
The information set used in the analysis consists of weekly data from January 1999 to
September 2009 of brent, WTI, spot gasoil and gasoline, and retail petrol and diesel prices
for the euro area, its largest four countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, and the
US. I follow the European terminology and use the word petrol for retail gasoline and
diesel for retail gasoil throughout the rest of the paper. The terms gasoline and gasoil
will instead be used for the reﬁned products at the wholesale (spot) level. Retail prices
for the euro area, Germany, France, Italy and Spain are daily data collected once a week
from the Eurostat Weekly Oil Bulletin (WOB henceforth). Since they are collected on
Monday I match them with the average oil price of the previous week. Brent, WTI,
spot gasoil and gasoline, as well as US retail prices, are weekly averages from the Energy
Information Administration.6 I use brent prices for the euro area and WTI prices for the
US as a measure of crude oil price. Regarding spot gasoil and gasoline prices I follow
Meyler (2009) and use Rotterdam prices for the euro area, while for the US I follow Al
Gudhea et al. (2007) and use an average of the prices of the New York, Los Angeles and
Gulf prices.
When looking at the pass-trough from crude to retail prices it is customary to break
down the pricing chain in various steps. Here I look at two speciﬁc relationships: the
pass-through from crude to retail prices and the one from spot to retail prices. The wedge
between crude and spot prices accounts for reﬁning and shipping costs and margins, while
the diﬀerence between spot and retail prices includes distribution costs and margins,
see Figure 2 (adapted from Meyler, 2009, and ECB, forthcoming).7 I focus on these
two channels speciﬁcally as they seem the most relevant for policy makers. The direct
relationship between crude and retail prices might be of particular interest for central
banks for two reasons. First, the large press coverage that this link receives is likely to
inﬂuence consumers inﬂation perceptions and expectations. Second, inﬂation forecasts,
which play an important role for central banks, are usually conditional on a given future
path of the price of crude, which is traded in futures markets. Changes in the crude price
curve are behind high frequency revisions of inﬂation forecasts, largely through their
direct eﬀect on fuels prices. The pass-through from spot to retail prices, on the other
hand, might be of greater concern for market regulators as it reveals more clearly the
inﬂuence of the distribution market structure on ﬁnal prices.
Crude, spot and retail prices are plotted in Figure 3 and 4.8 Each Figure contains
two plots. The top one shows data for the euro area and for the four euro area countries
together with the price of brent and of the relevant wholesale reﬁned product (gasoline
for petrol and gasoil for diesel). The bottom one shows US retail prices together with
the price of WTI and of wholesale reﬁned products. Energy prices increased signiﬁcantly
6All data are considered excluding taxes.
7This obviously represents a simpliﬁcation of a process that involves many more steps.
8US data are converted in euros for illustrative purposes. In the empirical analysis, estimates for the
US are based on data in US$.
9in the past ten years, driven by a rising trend in the price of oil. Crude prices peaked
in the summer of 2008 and precipitated thereafter in the wake of the recent economic
slowdown. Following the abrupt fall in the second half of 2008 they started rising again:
at the end of the sample they were around three times higher than in 1999. The existence
of a common trend through the various stages of the pricing chain is pretty clear. In the
empirical part I test (and can not reject) the hypothesis that upstream and downstream
prices are cointegrated. Figure 5 shows the reﬁning and distribution costs and margins,
computed, respectively, as the diﬀerence between crude and spot and spot and retail
prices. Only data for the US and for the euro area are reported, not to ﬁll the plots with
too many lines. For petrol prices both wedges have remained broadly stable over the
past ten years, both in the US and in the euro area. In the case of diesel, on the other
hand, reﬁning margins show a smooth upward trend in the euro area, while they are much
more volatile in the US. The behavior of distribution margins is much more homogeneous
across geographic areas. They also have somewhat increased since 2005 to return to their
historical levels in the most recent months.9 To get a ﬁrst idea of the cross country
heterogeneity of fuels price developments I compare the unconditional distributions of
upstream and downstream price changes across products and countries. These are shown
in the histograms in Figures 6 and 7 for crude and spot prices and in Figures 8 to 11 for
retail prices. The distribution of crude and spot prices look very similar to each other.
Given the positive drift in these prices over the sample period it is not surprising that
they are slightly right skewed. Turning to retail prices, one can notice that the shape of
the distributions for the US and the euro area are very similar to those of upstream prices,
both for petrol and for diesel. Italy and Spain, on the other hand, present a large spike
at zero, indicating considerably higher stickiness in the adjustment of liquid fuels prices
in these two countries than in the euro area average. Germany, and to a lesser extent
France, are the countries where prices appear to be most ﬂexible. Also notice that visual
inspection of these histograms does not suggest the existence of stark asymmetries in any
of the countries considered.
Finally I perform an analysis of the level of integration of the variables. Standard unit
root tests (Table 1) cannot reject the presence of a stochastic trend in the levels, while
the presence of a unit root in the ﬁrst diﬀerences is strongly rejected. I therefore proceed
by modeling the variables as being I(1) in the levels.
9The diﬀerent behavior of diesel prices across the Atlantic has been the center of a heated debate in
the past few years. According to most commentators the temporary drift in euro area margins is due to
a number of factors, among which the increasing reﬁning costs imposed by tighter regulation in the euro
area on the sulphur content of diesel together with higher demand due to the rising penetration of diesel
cars.
104 A structural model of (possibly asymmetric) dynamic
adjustment
The pass-through from oil to liquid fuels prices is modeled in a two equations structural
model, in which cointegration between oil and liquid fuels prices is entertained and down-
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yt if yt > 0
0 if yt <= 0
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(3)
Asymmetric adjustment works through three channels: ﬁrst, a higher response to a
positive, rather than negative, disequilibrium from the long run relationship ecmt (to
be deﬁned below), second, a higher direct impact of past positive oil price changes,
third, a stronger correlation with own positive lags. Most of the papers on asymmet-
ric price adjustment have based their analysis on an exclusion test of these regressors
from equation (2).
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t + ut (4)
The residual ut represents an equilibrium correction term if it is stationary. The
parameters of the cointegration relationship  and  are estimated in a ﬁrst stage
(see Engle and Granger, 1987).11
3. 1t and 2t are assumed to be uncorrelated.
10The model is estimated in absolute changes, rather than log changes. See Meyler (2009) for a
discussion on why it is desirable to do so in periods of volatile oil prices but relatively stable margins.
11The error correction term is speciﬁed with the minus sign to keep the deﬁnition of its censored
counterpart ecm
+
t consistent with (3). An error correction term in the oil price equation was generally
found to have a coeﬃcient not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero and therefore excluded.
11The crucial aspect of model (1)-(2), which has direct relevance for impulse response analy-
sis, is that an unexpected shock to the change in oil prices (1t) aﬀects contemporaneously
gasoline prices (its impact is b12;0 times 1t, b12;0 + b
+
12;0 times 1t if 1t > 0), while the
gasoline price shock (2t) feeds back to oil prices only with a lag. This exclusion restric-
tion (b12;0 = 0), together with the hypothesis that 1t and 2t are uncorrelated, makes the
system exactly identiﬁed and ordinary least squares a consistent estimator.12
4.1 Computing impulse-responses
In a model like (1)-(2) the impulse response function (IRF) at horizon h depends on:
1. the slope parameters of the model ().
2. the size of the shock ().
3. past observations (!t 1).
4. future shocks (1t+1;1t+2;:::;1t+h and 2t+1;2t+2;:::;2t+h)
Since the model does not have a moving average representation, IRF need to be obtained
by simulation methods. For a speciﬁc value of the slopes  the h steps ahead response
to an oil price shock of size  can be estimated as the diﬀerence between two conditional
forecasts in the following steps:
1. Deﬁne a history of the data !t 1 by picking p and  p consecutive values of poil and
q and  q consecutive values of pfuel.
2. Using model (1)-(2) simulate two paths of the endogenous variables. The ﬁrst is ob-
tained by hitting the oil equation with a sequence of shocks (s
1 = [;1t+2;:::;1t+h])
where the sequence ([1t+2;:::;1t+h]) is drawn from the empirical distribution and
the second equation with a sequence (s
2 = [2t+1;:::;2t+h]), entirely drawn from
their empirical distribution. In the second path the shocks to both equations (b
1 and
b
2) are drawn from their respective empirical distributions. Label the two simulated
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4. Repeat steps from 2 to 3 m times and average the responses across m. This amounts
to averaging out future shocks and therefore obtaining a response that is conditional
only on the parameters (), the size of the shocks () and past history (!t 1):
Ih
y(;!t 1;).
12Notice that these identifying assumptions are akin to causal ordering restrictions in a structural VAR.
125. Further average across all histories to obtain the unconditional response: Ih
y(;).
Unconditional IRF in a non-linear setting are theoretically neat but in practice computa-
tionally very demanding. To give an idea of the problem consider that researchers usually
set m = 250 in step 4 and that the number of iterations in step 5 equals the sample size,
T. The total number of replications required to obtain one realization of the IRF is then
mT. Since in my case T is greater than 500 I would need more than 125000 simulations
to obtain a single IRF. If one wanted to get some measure of uncertainty around the IRF
by bootstrapping the regression coeﬃcients and computing an IRF for each bootstrap
replication the problem would become intractable. To avoid these complications the ex-
isting literature has relied on a very restricted form of the correct IRF, the cumulative
adjustment function (CAF). The CAF can be obtained directly from the parameters of




























and the initial condition is B
+
0 = b21;0 + b
+
21;0. In the case of a negative shock the CAF is







It can be seen from (6) that the CAF diﬀers from the true impulse response function
in four respects. The CAF is independent from:
1. the size of the shock 
2. the history of the data
3. future shocks
4. the parameters of equation (1)
To better clarify the relationship between the CAF and the correct IRF it is possible to
modify the simulation steps described above and obtain the CAF in three, instead of ﬁve,
steps:
1. Set the history of the data !t 1 to 0.
2. Using model (1)-(2) simulate two paths of the endogenous variables. The ﬁrst is ob-
tained by hitting the oil equation with a sequence of shocks (s
1 = [1;1t+2;:::;1t+h])
where the sequence ([1t+2;:::;1t+h]) is such as to make the endogenous responses
of the oil price from the second step forward exactly equal to zero. The CAF there-
fore measures the response to a one oﬀ shock to the oil price level of unit size. The
shocks to the second equation (s
2 = [2t+1;:::;2t+h]), are all set to zero. In the
second path the shocks to both equations (b
1 and b
2) are set to zero. Label the two










The CAF therefore stands on the other end of the spectrum of tractability with respect
to the true IRF. The former can be obtained without any simulation but at the cost of
neglecting important sources of uncertainty and the non linear nature of the model, the
latter is computationally costly yet it correctly portrays the system dynamics.
In the empirical analysis that follows I work with the non linear IRF but, to make it less
computationally demanding, I restrict it along one particular dimension: the dependence
on the history of the data. More speciﬁcally I modify the ﬁrst step of the IRF simulation
by setting the history of the data !t 1 equal to the sample average of poil and pfuel
(which I deﬁne  !t 1). This simpliﬁcation makes step 5 in the IRF simulation unnecessary,
while all the remaining steps are exactly the same. This approximate IRF is therefore
conditional on the parameters (), the size of the shocks () and the average history
Ih
y(;  !t 1;). The computational beneﬁt of such an approximation is sizable as the
number of simulations needed to get a single IRF drops from around 125000 to 250. The
cost in terms of precision, however, needs to be assessed. In the Appendix I present the
results of a simulation exercise in which I compare the CAF with the correct and the
approximate IRF and show that, while the CAF gives a distorted picture of the response
of the endogenous variables to an oil price shock, the approximate IRF that conditions
on the mean of the data tracks the true one very accurately.
4.2 IRF asymmetry tests and bootstrap
Once IRF to positive and negative shocks have been computed, a formal test on the
presence of asymmetries can be carried out with a Wald test on the cumulated responses





y( ) = 0 for h = 0;1;2;:::;H (7)
To carry out this test an estimate of the variance of Ih
y() Ih
y( ) is needed. Uncertainty
is measured via bootstrap simulation, that is, artiﬁcial samples are generated using model
(1)-(2), and for each sample the IRF to a positive and negative shock are estimated. The
variance of Ih
y() Ih
y( ) is then computed using the bootstrapped IRF estimates. Since,
as will be discussed in the empirical results sections, the OLS residuals present signiﬁcant
heteroskedasticity I employ a recursive-design wild bootstrap, which Gonçalves and Kilian
(2004) show to give consistent parameter estimates in dynamic models in the presence of
conditional heteroskedasticity of unknown form. To illustrate the method, in the case of
an AR(1) model a pseudo time series y?
t is generated as follows:
y
?






t = ^ tt, t is a zero mean, unit variance, i.i.d. sequence, ^  and ^ t are estimates
of the autoregressive parameter and of the regression errors. I set the initial conditions
14to the true values and draw the sequence t from a zero mean, unit variance, normal
distribution.13
5 Empirical results
In this section I present the main empirical results. Since the number of estimated equa-
tions is rather high (6 countries, 2 products and two channels, from crude to retail and
from reﬁned to retail, for a total of 48 equations), only a summary of the regression results
is reported, together with impulse responses and asymmetry tests.14
5.1 From crude to retail prices
I start by using model (1)-(2) to explore the direct relationship from crude to retail
(petrol and diesel) prices. Summary results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. These
tables are organized in three panels. The top panel shows the parameter estimates of
the long run regressions (4) and a unit root test on their residuals that is used to check
for cointegration. The middle (bottom) panel reports the salient results of the estimates
of the dynamic retail (upstream) price equation. For the dynamic retail price equations,
besides the number of lags, the results of a test on the coeﬃcient of adjustment to the
long-run equilibrium (ECM drop test in the table, corresponding to the test dfuel = 0),
of standard tests on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the residuals and a
measure of ﬁt are shown. For the dynamic upstream price equations I report the number
of lags, the results of a test on the joint signiﬁcance of autoregressive terms, and of a test
on the signiﬁcance of feedback terms from downstream prices, residuals diagnostics tests
(heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation) and a measure of ﬁt.
Starting from the long run equations in Tables 2 and 3, the pass-through from crude to
petrol prices is estimated to be very close to 1 in the euro area, slightly larger for the US.
The long-run response of diesel to crude oil prices is larger, of the order of 1.3, most likely
owing to the fact that the reﬁning process of diesel is itself very oil intensive. Average
equilibrium prices are generally much higher in Italy than elsewhere, both for petrol and
for diesel prices, due to a higher long-run constant , which captures all other margins
and costs that do not depend on the price of oil, in the face of a pass-through from oil
to retail prices similar to that found in other countries. Unit root tests on the residuals
of these equations conﬁrm that there is a cointegration relationship between crude and
retail prices as the presence of a stochastic trend is strongly rejected in all cases.
Turning to the dynamic petrol and diesel equations, three results stand out. First,
in all the retail price equations the error correction term plays a signiﬁcant role as the
dfuel parameter is always found to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Second, retail price
13Gonçalves and Kilian(2004) ﬁnd that this method is robust to the choice of alternative zero mean
unit variance distributions from which t can be drawn.
14Full results are available upon request.
15equations residuals show signiﬁcant heteroskedasticity but no sign of autocorrelation.
Third, these simple dynamic equations capture more than 50% of the overall volatility of
liquid fuels prices in all countries but Germany where the ﬁt is lower (below 40%). The
worse performance of the model in Germany is very likely to be related to the fact that
fuels prices are daily while oil prices are weekly averages (referring to the previous week).
The former are by construction more volatile than the latter as the weekly average washes
away transitory shocks. This could lower the model ﬁt in countries where prices change
very frequently (like Germany) and provide a better ﬁt in countries where ﬁrms adjust
their prices less often and are therefore likely to base their decisions on longer lasting
variations of costs (like Italy and Spain). Also this might explain the fact that models
for the US generally have a better ﬁt since for the US weekly averages of retail prices are
used.
The results for the oil price equations show that (i) oil prices are signiﬁcantly auto-
correlated and (ii) in most cases they respond to downstream prices. This result alone
would be suﬃcient to cast doubts on all the empirical experiments on the asymmetry of
fuels prices based on tests on the parameters of equation (2) or on the CAF, as they both
ignore the endogenous response of upstream shocks to own shocks and the interaction
between upstream and downstream prices. Oil price changes, however, are barely pre-
dictable on the basis of past own and retail price changes, as generally less than 10% of
their variance can be explained by this model.15 Oil price equation residuals also show
signiﬁcant heteroskedasticity but no autocorrelation.
5.1.1 IRF and Asymmetry tests
The estimated responses of petrol and diesel prices to a one standard deviation oil price
shock are presented in Figure 12 and 13, where the median response together with the
15th and the 85th percentiles are plotted. The dash-dotted lines represent the response
to a positive shock while the continuous lines are the responses to a negative shock.16 An
oil price shock is completely passed through to petrol and diesel prices in the euro area in
3 to 4 weeks. Within the euro area the fastest adjustment occurs in Germany, where after
the ﬁrst week retail prices have already reached their equilibrium level, and the slowest
in Italy and Spain.17 This cross-country heterogeneity in the IRF is not surprising, given
the presence of a large spike at zero in the distribution of fuels price changes in the latter
15The low ﬁt of this equation is not by itself worrysome, as it simply indicates that most oil price
changes can actually be interpreted as shocks.
16The IRF have been rescaled (ex-post) with the new oil price equilibrium after the shock, so as to
provide a measure of the eﬀect of a shock on fuels prices relative to the long run eﬀect of the same shock
on the price of oil.
17Notice that I report quite tight conﬁdence bands in the charts, so the exact timing of completion of
the pass-through, that is the week in which the long-run pass-through  is contained within a 95% IRF
conﬁdence interval, is shorter. Formal tests for the timing of the complete pass through are not presented
because the results of the empirical analysis show that there is very little asymmetry so that the timing
of the pass-through would be better estimated using a simpler linear model, as in Meyler (2009).
16countries (see Figure 9). The response in the US is slower (yet this could be due to the fact
that for the US weekly averages, rather than a single daily price for each week, are used)
and uncertainty around the median response is generally higher than elsewhere. Visual
inspection does not suggest any asymmetry in the response of petrol and diesel prices in
any countries, as the responses to a positive and a negative shock are never disjoint.
A crucial feature of model (1)-(2) is that the response depends non linearly on the size
of the shocks. Fuels prices could therefore respond in a diﬀerent fashion to larger oil price
shocks. Figures 14 and 15 show the response of petrol and diesel prices to a two standard
deviation oil price shock. In the case of petrol prices the results are very similar to those
obtained for a standard sized shock: the persistence of the responses is unchanged and
there is no clear separation between the eﬀects of positive and negative shocks. The size
of the underlying shock seems to matter more for diesel prices as the diﬀerence between
the response to positive and negative shocks becomes much clearer especially in France,
US and in the euro area.
The statistical signiﬁcance of such diﬀerences is next assessed through the Wald asym-
metry tests discussed above. In Table 4 to 7 I report the results of the tests on the IRF in
both cases of a standard and of a large shock. Only the results for the contemporaneous,
the ﬁrst and the third week, are reported as the responses quickly approach their com-
mon long run values and after the third week the p-values of the tests get very close to 1.
Based on these Wald tests the null hypothesis of symmetry is basically never rejected as
all test statistics have p-values well above 5%. The only exception, given by the impact
(lag 0) response of diesel prices in the euro area in the case of large shocks, should not
be overstated since, given how data are constructed for the euro area and for the four
euro area countries considered, the contemporaneous response depends on the correlation
between retail prices on Monday and the average oil price in the previous week. As re-
tailers presumably need some days to ﬁlter out the persistence of oil price changes before
setting a new price, the contemporaneous correlation (and therefore the contemporaneous
response to shocks) is likely to be noisier than the correlations at longer lags.
5.2 From reﬁned to retail prices
I now turn to a lower stage of the pricing chain, the relationship between spot and retail
prices. A summary of regression estimates is presented in Tables 8 and 9, which are
organized exactly like Tables 2 and 3. The results are qualitatively very similar to those
obtained when using crude prices. First, looking at the long-run equation results (top
panel) it can be seen that retail and spot prices share a common trend given the station-
arity of the residuals of the long run equations. The long run pass-through of both petrol
and diesel prices is now close to unity, in line with ﬁndings in Meyler (2009). Second,
results on the dynamic retail price equations (middle panels) show that spot prices are
strong attractors for downstream prices as the error correction term enters these with a
coeﬃcient signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Third, the residuals of both spot and retail
price equations are heteroskedastic but do not show any sign of autocorrelation. Fourth,
17spot gasoline and gasoil prices are autocorrelated and, in most cases, also respond to re-
tail prices. Notice, also, that the goodness of ﬁt of the retail price equations is now much
higher, due to the higher proximity of reﬁned and retail products in the production chain,
albeit still lower in Germany than elsewhere. Spot prices are nonetheless very noisy, so
that most of their weekly variance is left unexplained by these simple equations.
5.2.1 IRF and Asymmetry tests
The dynamic responses of petrol and diesel prices to a standard spot price shock are shown
in Figures 16 and 17. The pass-through from reﬁned to retail products is not any faster
than that from crude to retail products: the number of weeks needed to reach the new
long-run equilibrium following a shock is again around two weeks in the case of Germany
and 4/5 weeks in all the other countries. This is not surprising since oil is a storable
commodity and inventories of crude and reﬁned oil are quickly and simultaneously priced
at the level induced by underlying shocks (GAO, 1993). The stickiness of consumer
prices on the other hand, may reﬂect rigidities speciﬁc to the retail sector. Retailers,
for example, might invest in market shares by buﬀering temporary oil price increases
through their margins and passing onto consumers only lasting changes in spot prices.
Again, based on the visual inspection of the IRF, no stark diﬀerence between the responses
to positive and negative shocks can be spotted. The response to large shocks (Figures
18 and 19), diﬀers only marginally from those to standard surprises. The results of the
Wald asymmetry tests reported in Tables 10 to 13 suggest that, also at this lower stage
of the pricing chain, no systematic asymmetric pattern can be found. In a few cases
(petrol prices in the US and in France, and diesel prices in the US) the tests reject the
null hypothesis of symmetric adjustment at the 5% conﬁdence level. In these three cases,
however, asymmetries are extremely short lived and, in two cases out of three, conﬁned
to the case of relatively large shocks, which, by deﬁnition, have a low probability of
occurring. In interpreting the signiﬁcance of these asymmetries it is useful to keep in
mind that previous studies that emphasized the existence of asymmetric adjustment in
the prices of petroleum products found diﬀerences in the response to unexpected rises
and decreases up to the tenth (Borenstein et al., 1994) or even the twentieth (Radchenko,
2005a) week after the shock.
5.3 Robustness checks
The results presented so far constitute a compelling evidence against the “rockets and
feathers” eﬀect. I check their robustness along two dimensions. First, I modify the algo-
rithm for computing IRF to accommodate serial correlation in the variance of the shocks.
This robustness check is motivated by the presence of signiﬁcant heteroskedasticity in the
estimated errors, as signaled by the results of the tests shown in Tables 2, 3, 8 and 9 which
warned of signiﬁcant ARCH eﬀects in the residuals. While the wild bootstrap procedure
that I employ makes parameter estimates robust to residuals heteroskedasticity there
18could still be a problem with the way future random shocks are drawn when simulating
the IRF. As explained in subsection 4.1, the IRF are obtained by hitting each equation
with a sequence of shocks, where the ﬁrst shock to the oil price equation is restricted
to be a constant  and the subsequent ones are drawn from the empirical distribution.
Increasing the size of the initial shock  does not require a modiﬁcation of the algorithm
if errors are i.i.d., the case analyzed by Kilian and Vigfusson (2009). If the variance of
the errors, however, depends on the size of past shocks, a larger initial shocks  has to be
followed by a shock drawn from a distribution with higher variance. I therefore estimate
model (1)-(2) specifying an ARCH(4) process for the residuals:
t = tut (9)

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where ut is a N(0,1) random variable, and then use the estimates of the parameters of
equation (10) to simulate the future shocks in the IRF algorithm rather than drawing
them from the empirical distribution. Results for the responses to crude oil price shocks
are presented in Tables 14 to 17, while the tests on the responses to reﬁned oil price shocks
are shown in Tables 18 to 21. It is clear that using this variation of the model yields even
stronger results in favor of symmetry, as the Wald tests reject the null hypothesis even
more sporadically than in the benchmark cases.
The second robustness check consists of verifying whether the results hold in periods
of low and high oil price volatility. The issue of oil price volatility and asymmetries is
investigated by Radchenko (2005b), where asymmetries are found to be positively cor-
related with the standard deviation of oil price shocks. Since in our sample we have a
rather clear separation between a ﬁrst period of relatively low turbulence, which ended
more or less in 2005, followed by a period of high volatility, we proceed by repeating the
empirical analysis on two equally sized sub-samples. The former includes data between
January 1999 and the second week of April 2004, the latter starts in the third week of
April 2004 and ends in September 2009. In the second subsample the standard deviation
of oil price changes is around three times as high as in the ﬁrst one. Results, shown
in Tables 22 to 29, are overall in line with those for the full sample: some asymmetries
show up in response to large oil price shocks in the US and in France in both sub-periods.
There are a few more cases in which the tests reject the symmetry hypothesis for Germany
and the euro area average. In all these cases, however, asymmetry is found only at the
contemporaneous lag.
6 Conclusions
The increased volatility of oil prices in the past few years has revived the interest both
by antitrust authorities and central banks on whether petroleum prices rise faster than
19they fall in response to oil price ﬂuctuations. This paper revisits this issue for the US, the
euro area, Italy, Germany, France and Spain adopting a methodology that improves upon
the literature in two respects. First, a structural model is used in which upstream and
downstream prices are modeled jointly and an oil price shock is identiﬁed. This approach
proves to be superior to the single equation one, widely used in this literature, given
that oil price changes are autocorrelated and also respond to downstream prices. Second,
inference is based on formal tests on the dynamic response of downstream prices to shocks
to upstream costs rather than on regression coeﬃcients, taking into proper account the
non linearity of this response implied by the presence of endogenous censored variables.
The empirical analysis shows that fuels prices respond within 4/5 weeks to an oil price
shock both in the US and in the euro area. Some heterogeneity emerges across euro
area countries, with Italy and Spain adjusting signiﬁcantly more slowly than the rest.
Despite some (very mild) stickiness in retail prices, no signiﬁcant evidence of systematic
asymmetries in the response of retail (petrol and diesel) prices to upstream (crude and
reﬁned) shocks emerges. This result is robust across periods of high and low oil price
volatility and holds both for standard and large shocks. Some asymmetries are found in
the case of the US and of France. They are, however, sporadic and very short lived.
This paper leaves a number of open questions. In particular integrating the non-linear
IRF in a framework that allows for the parameters to change over time or to switch
across regimes could oﬀer further insights on the oil/retail price relationship. Even more
interestingly the issue of changing oil price volatility could be more carefully modeled.
Both issues are left for future research.
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Figure 1: Motor fuels inﬂation and Google Index of the number of queries of the word
“deﬂation” since 2004
Note to Figure 1. Data for fuel inﬂation rates are from Eurostat for the euro area and from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics for the US. In the graph we report the percentage change over the previous three
months of the seasonally adjusted index. The Google Index is the monthly average of the weekly index
obtained from www:google:com=insights=search=#. The data used in this article were downloaded on
December 4th, 2009. The index summarizes the incidence of searches in Google of the word “deﬂation”











Figure 2: Stylized pricing chain from crude to retail prices
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Figure 3: Petrol and oil prices (euros per thousand litres, eight weeks averages)
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Figure 4: Diesel and oil prices (euros per thousand litres, eight weeks averages)
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Figure 5: Reﬁning and distribution costs and margins (euros per thousand litres, eight
weeks averages)







































Figure 7: Spot prices changes distribution









































Figure 9: Petrol price changes distribution: euro area countries









































Figure 11: Diesel price changes distribution: euro area countries






















































Figure 12: Response of petrol prices to a one standard deviation oil price shock
Note to Figure 12. All impulse responses are normalized by the long-run response of oil prices to the
shock.






















































Figure 13: Response of diesel prices to a one standard deviation oil price shock






















































Figure 14: Response of petrol prices to a two standard deviation oil price shock






















































Figure 15: Response of diesel prices to a two standard deviation oil price shock






















































Figure 16: Response of petrol prices to a one standard deviation spot gasoline price shock






















































Figure 17: Response of diesel prices to a one standard deviation spot gasoil price shock






















































Figure 18: Response of petrol prices to a two standard deviation spot gasoline price shock






















































Figure 19: Response of diesel prices to a two standard deviation gasoil price shock
37Levels First diﬀerences
ADF Phillips-Perron ADF Phillips-Perron
US - diesel 0.57 0.62 0.00 0.00
US - petrol 0.57 0.63 0.00 0.00
US - gasoil 0.59 0.58 0.00 0.00
US - gasoline 0.47 0.56 0.00 0.00
US - crude 0.67 0.59 0.00 0.00
Germany - petrol 0.69 0.66 0.00 0.00
France - petrol 0.68 0.68 0.00 0.00
Italy - petrol 0.69 0.72 0.00 0.00
Spain - petrol 0.67 0.71 0.00 0.00
euro area - petrol 0.67 0.69 0.00 0.00
Germany - diesel 0.69 0.69 0.00 0.00
France - diesel 0.68 0.68 0.00 0.00
Italy - diesel 0.73 0.73 0.00 0.00
Spain - diesel 0.73 0.73 0.00 0.00
euro area - diesel 0.72 0.71 0.00 0.00
euro area - gasoil 0.62 0.61 0.00 0.00
euro area - gasoline 0.60 0.57 0.00 0.00
euro area - crude oil 0.63 0.64 0.00 0.00
Table 1: Unit root tests on the variables in levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences
Note to Table 1. The lag length in the regressions on which the unit root tests
are based is selected on the basis of the Akaike criterion.
38Germany France Italy Spain Euro area USA
Long-run equation
 121.50 98.25 166.47 133.47 140.57 144.65
 1.00 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.04 1.15
Cointegration test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Petrol equation
lags petrol - petrol equation 1 2 2 2 3 4
lags oil - petrol equation 1 1 2 2 2 4
ECM drop test (p-val) 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.95 0.55 0.82 0.70 0.89 0.59
 R fuel equation 0.34 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.55 0.65
Oil equation
lags petrol - oil equation 2 3 2 3 2 4
lags oil - oil equation 1 4 1 4 1 3
Drop autocorr. terms 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Drop feedback test (p-val) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.75 0.87 0.62 0.47 0.47 0.24
 R oil equation 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.11
Number of obs. 557 555 557 555 557 555
Table 2: Regression results summary: from crude to petrol prices
Note to Table 2. The estimation sample goes from the ﬁrst week of January
1999 to the second week of September 2009. The cointegration test is a unit
root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller) on the residuals of the long run equation.
The lags in the dynamic equations are selected on the basis of the Akaike
criterion. The ECM drop test is a Wald test on the ECM coeﬃcient dfuel in
equation (2). The residuals heteroskedasticity test is a Lagrange Multiplier test
for ARCH eﬀects up to the fourth order. The residuals autocorrelation test in
the dynamic fuels equation is a Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for
serial correlation up to the fourth order. The drop feedback test is a joint Wald
test on the b12;i coeﬃcients in equation (1).
39Germany France Italy Spain Euro area USA
Long-run equation
 79.78 61.05 102.61 89.78 86.90 44.52
 1.29 1.32 1.39 1.34 1.33 1.33
Cointegration test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Diesel equation
lags diesel - diesel equation 2 3 2 1 2 3
lags oil - diesel equation 1 1 1 6 1 1
ECM drop test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.59 0.63 0.54 0.48 0.53 0.98
 R fuel equation 0.36 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.63 0.62
Oil equation
lags diesel - oil equation 1 2 5 1 1 4
lags oil - oil equation 1 1 1 1 1 1
Drop autocorr. terms 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Drop feedback test (p-val) 0.93 0.22 0.01 0.03 0.72 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.63 0.17 0.85 0.57 0.50 0.46
 R oil equation 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07
Number of obs. 558 557 554 558 558 555
Table 3: Regression results summary: from crude to diesel prices
Note to Table 3. The estimation sample goes from the ﬁrst week of January
1999 to the second week of September 2009. The cointegration test is a unit
root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller) on the residuals of the long run equation.
The lags in the dynamic equations are selected on the basis of the Akaike
criterion. The ECM drop test is a Wald test on the ECM coeﬃcient dfuel in
equation (2). The residuals heteroskedasticity test is a Lagrange Multiplier test
for ARCH eﬀects up to the fourth order. The residuals autocorrelation test in
the dynamic fuels equation is a Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for
serial correlation up to the fourth order. The drop feedback test is a joint Wald
test on the b12;i coeﬃcients in equation (1).
40Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.73 0.21 0.77 0.12 0.63 0.45
1 0.85 0.60 0.94 0.47 0.94 0.86
3 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.85 0.99 0.99
Table 4: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 1 s.d. oil price shock
Note to Tables from 4 to 7. P-values reported in these tables are based on the 2
H+1
distribution.
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.49 0.18 0.73 0.84 0.47 0.74
1 0.89 0.57 0.88 0.87 0.80 0.95
3 0.99 0.89 0.99 0.93 0.68 0.99
Table 5: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 1 s.d. oil price shock
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.79 0.58 0.43 0.69 0.20 0.26
1 0.98 0.80 0.74 0.66 0.63 0.29
3 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.88 0.88
Table 6: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 2 s.d. oil price shock
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.46 0.03 0.22
1 0.60 0.62 0.66 0.84 0.23 0.51
3 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.98 0.82 0.93
Table 7: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 2 s.d. oil price shock
41Germany France Italy Spain Euro area USA
Long-run equation
 96.77 75.21 144.91 111.02 117.33 101.62
 0.97 1.03 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.09
Cointegration test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Petrol equation
lags fuel - fuel equation 4 3 3 1 4 4
lags oil - fuel equation 4 4 6 4 6 1
ECM drop test (p-val) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.59 0.25 0.17 0.61 0.02 0.32
 R fuel equation 0.51 0.78 0.63 0.69 0.77 0.86
Gasoline equation
lags gas - oil equation 4 1 3 1 2 4
lags oil - oil equation 3 3 3 3 4 3
Drop autocorr. terms 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01
Drop feedback terms 0.21 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.02 0.26 0.07 0.24 0.05 0.00
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.99 0.71 0.99 0.97 0.76 0.56
 R oil equation 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.09
Number of obs. 555 556 556 556 555 555
Table 8: Regression results summary: from reﬁned gasoline to petrol prices
Note to Table 8. The estimation sample goes from the ﬁrst week of January
1999 to the second week of September 2009. The cointegration test is a unit
root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller) on the residuals of the long run equation.
The lags in the dynamic equations are selected on the basis of the Akaike
criterion. The ECM drop test is a Wald test on the ECM coeﬃcient dfuel in
equation (2). The residuals heteroskedasticity test is a Lagrange Multiplier test
for ARCH eﬀects up to the fourth order. The residuals autocorrelation test in
the dynamic fuels equation is a Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for
serial correlation up to the fourth order. The drop feedback test is a joint Wald
test on the b12;i coeﬃcients in equation (1).
42Germany France Italy Spain Euro area USA
Long-run equation
 89.58 70.08 112.95 100.07 96.49 40.85
 1.04 1.07 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.08
Cointegration test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Diesel equation
lags fuel - fuel equation 4 1 2 1 1 3
lags oil - fuel equation 6 6 4 6 6 1
ECM drop test (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.14 0.54 0.61 0.19 0.95 0.01
 R fuel equation 0.49 0.78 0.60 0.66 0.79 0.81
Gasoil equation
lags gas - oil equation 1 2 2 2 1 4
lags oil - oil equation 3 3 1 1 3 1
Drop autocorr. terms 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Drop feedback terms 0.23 0.00 0.13 0.48 0.50 0.00
Res. heteros. (p-val) 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.00
Res. autocor (p-val) 0.49 0.93 0.30 0.17 0.37 0.58
 R oil equation 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06
Number of obs. 556 556 557 557 556 555
Table 9: Regression results summary: from reﬁned gasoil to diesel prices
Note to Table 9. The estimation sample goes from the ﬁrst week of January
1999 to the second week of September 2009. The cointegration test is a unit
root test (Augmented Dickey Fuller) on the residuals of the long run equation.
The lags in the dynamic equations are selected on the basis of the Akaike
criterion. The ECM drop test is a Wald test on the ECM coeﬃcient dfuel in
equation (2). The residuals heteroskedasticity test is a Lagrange Multiplier test
for ARCH eﬀects up to the fourth order. The residuals autocorrelation test in
the dynamic fuels equation is a Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier test for
serial correlation up to the fourth order. The drop feedback test is a joint Wald
test on the b12;i coeﬃcients in equation (1).
43Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.75 0.98 0.89 0.06 0.59 0.01
1 0.96 0.80 0.98 0.41 0.90 0.19
3 1.00 0.94 0.99 0.90 0.97 0.66
Table 10: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 1 s.d. spot gasoline price
shock
Note to Tables from 10 to 13. P-values reported in these tables are based on the 2
H+1
distribution.
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.31 0.32 0.68 0.33 0.56 0.39
1 0.76 0.24 0.92 0.79 0.39 0.53
3 0.99 0.73 0.99 0.94 0.83 0.90
Table 11: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 1 s.d. spot gasoil price
shock
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.62 0.01 0.60 0.26 0.40 0.63
1 0.81 0.02 0.87 0.14 0.44 0.94
3 0.92 0.37 0.99 0.75 0.91 0.90
Table 12: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 2 s.d. spot gasoline price
shock
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.92 0.68 0.69 0.42 0.38 0.00
1 1.00 0.91 0.59 0.84 0.62 0.05
3 0.74 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.96 0.40
Table 13: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 2 s.d. spot gasoil price
shock
44Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.45 0.75 0.82 0.31 0.16 0.57
1 0.65 0.87 0.88 0.76 0.52 0.91
3 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.98 0.92 1.00
Table 14: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 1 s.d. oil price shock -
shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
Note to Tables from 14 to 17. P-values reported in these tables are based on the 2
H+1
distribution.
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.98 0.81 0.92 0.14 0.18 0.96
1 1.00 0.56 0.99 0.44 0.61 0.97
3 1.00 0.87 0.99 0.91 0.97 1.00
Table 15: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 1 s.d. oil price shock -
shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.39 0.29 0.77 0.99 0.89 0.88
1 0.83 0.62 0.98 0.98 0.73 0.92
3 0.96 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.99
Table 16: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 2 s.d. oil price shock -
shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.41 0.05 0.78 0.20 0.56 0.62
1 0.52 0.33 0.98 0.47 0.91 0.88
3 0.92 0.69 1.00 0.91 0.96 0.98
Table 17: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 2 s.d. oil price shock -
shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
45Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.14 0.18 0.39 0.93 0.81 0.47
1 0.52 0.47 0.73 0.88 0.91 0.84
3 0.95 0.86 0.97 0.83 0.97 0.98
Table 18: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 1 s.d. spot gasoline price
shock - shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
Note to Tables from 18 to 21. P-values reported in these tables are based on the 2
H+1
distribution.
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.83 0.90 0.80 0.45 0.84 0.70
1 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.87 0.97 0.83
3 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.95 0.99
Table 19: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 1 s.d. spot gasoil price
shock - shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.82 0.05 0.79 0.08 0.67 0.76
1 0.89 0.23 0.93 0.36 0.42 0.92
3 0.92 0.79 0.98 0.87 0.89 1.00
Table 20: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 2 s.d. spot gasoline price
shock - shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.22 0.01 0.86 0.99 0.79 0.36
1 0.68 0.15 0.85 1.00 0.98 0.73
3 0.93 0.72 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.96
Table 21: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 2 s.d. spot gasoil price
shock - shocks simulated from an ARCH(4) model
46Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.40 0.85 0.04 0.63 0.19 0.68 0.58 0.74 0.73 0.96 0.98 0.84
1 0.65 0.99 0.29 0.94 0.61 0.95 0.79 0.65 0.85 0.48 1.00 0.99
3 0.94 1.00 0.68 1.00 0.92 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.88 1.00 0.98
Table 22: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 1 s.d. oil price shock -
sample split analysis
Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.06 0.03 0.27 0.40 0.27 0.10 0.01 0.28 0.85 0.99 0.85 0.56
1 0.07 0.26 0.71 0.64 0.56 0.50 0.27 0.66 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.60
3 0.57 0.73 0.99 0.96 0.85 0.93 0.84 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.95 0.97
Table 23: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 1 s.d. oil price shock -
sample split analysis
Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.21 0.27 0.88 0.47 0.75 0.72 0.68 0.25 0.37 0.65 0.88 0.19
1 0.69 0.38 0.54 0.47 0.97 0.60 0.96 0.71 0.63 0.85 0.75 0.19
3 0.98 0.88 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.72
Table 24: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 2 s.d. oil price shock -
sample split analysis
Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.04 0.08 0.20 0.77 0.35 0.05 0.40 0.01 0.48 0.27 0.00 0.01
1 0.33 0.45 0.66 0.47 0.80 0.38 0.73 0.21 0.52 0.54 0.07 0.08
3 0.86 0.50 0.93 0.93 0.99 0..87 0.98 0.80 0.91 0.93 0.58 0.63
Table 25: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 2 s.d. oil price shock -
sample split analysis
47Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.50 0.22 0.95 0.05 0.10 0.35 0.21 0.34 0.77 0.77 0.42 0.64
1 0.87 0.52 0.85 0.40 0.49 0.81 0.65 0.73 0.61 0.81 0.59 0.93
3 1.00 0.94 0.99 0.89 0.90 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.99 0.83 1.00
Table 26: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 1 s.d. spot gasoline price
shock - sample split analysis
Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.31 0.90 0.95 0.91 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.98 0.98 0.52 0.60 0.01
1 0.76 0.97 0.87 0.65 0.09 0.17 0.33 0.81 0.69 0.9 0.77 0.20
3 0.89 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.54 0.64 0.76 0.88 0.95 0.99 0.98 0.71
Table 27: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 1 s.d. spot gasoil price
shock - sample split analysis
Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.60 0.02 0.92 0.43 0.17 0.21 0.85 0.01 0.67 0.55 0.03 0.25
1 0.79 0.20 0.94 0.11 0.42 0.52 0.96 0.18 0.96 0.09 0.29 0.61
3 0.99 0.70 0.99 0.68 0.89 0.85 0.93 0.64 1.00 0.59 0.54 0.93
Table 28: Test of symmetry of the response of petrol prices to a 2 s.d. spot gasoline price
shock - sample split analysis
Jan. 1999 - Apr. 2004 Apr. 2004 - Sep. 2009
Steps (H) Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA Ger Fra Ita Spa EA USA
0 0.79 0.00 0.72 0.64 0.01 0.00 0.39 0.22 0.28 0.65 0.01 0.00
1 0.96 0.10 0.76 0.67 0.14 0.02 0.81 0.64 0.74 0.83 0.19 0.02
3 0.93 0.63 0.88 0.95 0..70 0.33 0.82 0.68 0.99 0.94 0.73 0.41
Table 29: Test of symmetry of the response of diesel prices to a 2 s.d. spot gasoil price
shock - sample split analysis
48A Impulse response function approximation
In this Appendix I compare the true IRF Ih
y(;) with (i) the IRF conditional on the
mean history of the data Ih
y(;  !t 1;) (ii) the CAF. Given that the true IRF requires
a large amount of simulations, as one needs to average across all possible histories and
future shocks, I conduct this comparison only for one set of parameters, that is the least
square estimate  = ls and only for a shock of one standard deviation.18 The results
(Figures 20 and 21) show that the approximate IRF (IRF (mean) in the graphs) tracks
very well the correct one.19 The CAF, on the other hand, strongly understates the long
run pass-through of oil prices to liquid fuels prices. This is because the CAF ignores the
endogenous response of oil prices following an own shock, and therefore approximates the
long run oil price response with the initial one (which in turn equals the size of the shock).
18I do not repeat this exercise for large shocks, since Kilian and Vigufsson (2009) show that the
importance of conditioning on the history of the data vanishes when the shock becomes large. Results
for a negative shock as well as for reﬁned products are in line with those for a positive shock; I do not
present them for brevity.
19All the IRF are rescaled by the long run response of the oil price obtained in the simulation that
takes into account all sources of uncertainty.








































































Figure 20: Correct and approximate IRF (petrol prices)
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